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Hegel’s Justification of the Human Right  
to Non-Domination
Abstract ‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined, and the designation 
‘human rights’ appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for 
omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have 
looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies his 
views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit (1997) has refocused 
attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican 
liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its value, or justifying it 
by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient both in theory and in practice. 
By reconstructing Kant’s Critical methodology and explicating the social character 
of rational justification in non-formal domains, Hegel shows that the republican 
right to non-domination is constitutive of the equally republican right to justification 
(Forst 2007) – both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rational 
justification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or imputations 
of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral, political and juridical 
implication of Hegel’s analysis of mutual recognition, and its fundamental, 
constitutive role in rational justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental 
republican right to non-domination must be determined by considering what 
forms of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, 
in view of its social, political and economic structures and functioning.
Keywords: Hegel, human rights, non-domination, Pettit, republicanism, justification, 
recognition
1 Introduction.
‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined; the designation ‘human 
rights’ appears seldom in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for 
omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that many of 
his readers have sought some modern counterpart to a Decalogue, and have 
neglected how Hegel justifies his views, and hence just what views he does 
justify. Philip Pettit (1997) has refocused attention on republican liberty. 
Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican liberty is a supremely import-
ant value, but justifying it by appeal to its value, to reflective equilibrium or 
to human psychology (Pettit 1997, 2001) are insufficient both in theory and 
in practice. By reconstructing Kant’s Critical methodology and explicating 
the social character of rational justification in non-formal domains, Hegel 
shows that the republican right to non-domination is constitutive of the 
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equally republican right to justification (Forst 2007, 2011) – both of which 
are necessary requirements for sufficient rational justification in all non-for-
mal domains. That is the direct moral, political and juridical implication of 
Hegel’s analysis of mutual recognition and its fundamental, constitutive role 
in rational justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican 
right to non-domination must be determined by considering what forms 
of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in 
view of its social, political and economic structures and their functioning.
To examine these issues about justice, justification and human rights, I ignore 
the still resounding din of the Hegel mythology (Kaufmann 1951, Stewart 
1996) and omit summary of my previous findings regarding Hegel’s repub-
licanism in his Philosophical Outlines of Justice (Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Rechts, 1821; ‘Rph’).1
Hegel’s Philosophical Outlines of Justice is perhaps the most ardent, system-
atic, cogently justified analysis of (small ‘r’!) republicanism possible. This is 
not a fact he could then and there trumpet: in 1792 Prussian censors blocked 
publication of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s quintessentially liberal tract, The 
Limits of State Action; in 1831 they interdicted mid-way the publication of 
Hegel’s (1831) searching analysis of the English reform bill. However polite-
ly they may have explained their interdiction, the censors can hardly have 
missed how Hegel’s magisterial contrast, between progressive Continental 
constitutional reform and the stagnation of entrenched feudal interests and 
constraints in England, held equally well of the entrenched feudal relics and 
sclerotic interests ruling Prussia – topics of Hegel’s earliest writings in polit-
ical philosophy (Hegel 1798a, 1798b (ms.), 1799–1803 (ms.); cf. idem. 1817, 
Falkenheim 19092).
2 Focussing the Issue of Justification.
Republican liberty in the form of non-domination is central to Rousseau’s 
independence requirement, viz.: that no one be allowed to obtain nor to wield 
the kind or extent of power, wealth or privilege to command unilaterally the 
choice or action of anyone else (Neuhouser 2000, 55–81; Westphal 2013a). 
Rousseau’s independence requirement is directly adopted and augmented 
by Kant’s explication of the sole innate right to freedom (MdS 6:237). Kant’s 
declaration of this sole innate right may appear to be no better justified than 
the purportedly self-evident truths exalted by the US Declaration of Inde-
pendence. The history of political appeals to self-evidence shows that in any 
1 See Neuhouser (2000), Conklin (2008), Westphal (forthcoming).
2 Falkenheim (1909) first identified Hegel as the translator and commentator to J.J. 
Cart’s anonymous letters.
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substantive domain, ‘self-evidence’ provides the mere appearance of rational 
justification. Kant does justify his sole innate right to freedom; Hegel fur-
ther explicated, undergirded and augmented Kant’s justification of the sole 
innate right to freedom. To appreciate the point, character and cogency of 
their justification of the sole innate right to freedom – including constitu-
tively the republican freedom from domination and the equally republican 
right to justification – first requires characterising the weaknesses of other 
popular justifications.
Pettit (1997, 2001) certainly is correct that in practice non-domination has 
important social-psychological dimensions, that we need not fear others, but 
instead can engage with others – any and all others – as moral equals. I agree 
emphatically that this kind of self-respect is morally, politically and psycho-
logically valuable, indeed decisively so. However, no appeal to psychology 
alone can justify the ‘value’ or the ideal(s) of non-domination, not, at least, until 
we have a sound and credible psychological theory to distinguish in princi-
ple and in practice between moral mental health and immoral sociopathy or 
arrogant egoism. Those bent on domination find it psychologically crucial 
to their own self-understanding, and very much worth their own while to 
dominate others. Alice Miller (1981–2005) has worked brilliantly to expose 
the psychological defects and effects of such domineering personalities, and 
to make their identification and preliminary diagnosis possible for a wide 
range of public officials, teachers, advisors to youth and mental health work-
ers. Perhaps our most serious political problem is to understand why such 
domineering personalities so easily find willing political audiences. When we 
met in 1987, Kurt Schmidt – a German economist old enough to have been 
in Hitler youth, yet young enough not to have been sacrificed in Hitler’s fi-
nal delusion, the Volkssturm – put it to me this way: ‘Every population has its 
3–4% crazies; we need to worry when others start listening to them’. Little 
in this problem is specifically philosophical. One philosophical aspect of this 
problem concerns the institutions required to prevent democracy from de-
teriorating into demagoguery. Another philosophical aspect of this problem 
concerns the philosophy of education required to construct and conduct ed-
ucation at all levels so as to prepare young adults to become, and then to be – 
by conducting themselves as – competent holders of that vital public office, 
the office of citizen (Green 1999, Curren & Metzger 2016, Westphal 2016e). 
Both of these points are justified by, and are required for, the republican 
rights to non-domination and to justification, both in theory and in practice.
3 Two Popular Failures of Justification.
To appeal to ‘values’, to ‘ideals’ or to some model of psychological health as a 
major premiss used to identify or to justify basic moral principles, however 
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natural such appeals may seem, is in principle insufficient, because any rea-
soning based upon those premises can only address whomever happens to 
share those premises. This is another, more general version of the problem 
already mentioned about appeals to ‘self-evidence’: In matters moral we most 
urgently need to secure both justification and, ultimately, agreement and ac-
ceptance in precisely those issues where disagreements arise most sharply, 
where these disagreements are often framed in terms of different supreme 
values, ideals, or models of healthy, decent, flourishing or pious individual 
lives. Preaching only to the converted cannot address divisive issues.
Rawls (1971) – or rather his avid converts – popularised appeal to ‘reflective 
equilibrium’: examining and re-examining our most considered principles 
and their relation(s) – or lack thereof – to our most considered particular 
moral judgments (or ‘intuitions’), so as to adjust these mutually to obtain a 
maximally satisfactory set of moral principles linked to specific moral judg-
ments, and then to use these to address issues of distributive justice. Despite 
its popularity – it is also used by Pettit’s republicanism (1997, 11, 102, 106, 
130, 275) – ‘reflective equilibrium’ is not a method, much less a method of 
justification, for four reasons: (1) Achieving reflective equilibrium is a condi-
tio sine qua non for holding a coherent – that is, a consistent and integrated 
– view, but coherence alone cannot justify any view, and especially not one 
regarding any controversial domain. (2) Nothing in this presumed ‘meth-
od’ of reflective equilibrium indicates how to distinguish between better or 
worse, sufficient or insufficient results of mutually accommodating princi-
ples and specific judgments. (3) Nothing in this presumed method of reflec-
tive equilibrium indicates how or why any two people, starting even with 
identical sets of principles and specifics, should equilibrate to the same co-
herent results, and so be led to argue for the same policy priorities. (4) This 
so-called ‘method’ indicates neither how nor how best to achieve sufficient 
agreement about any one coherent view, so as to use that agreement to justify 
credible consequences (implications, conclusions, policies) for any doubtful 
or controversial issue, not even amongst those who happen to share large-
ly the same principles and specific judgments (or ‘intuitions’). Quite simply 
and literally, ‘reflective equilibrium’ simply is not a method.
Rawls (1971, 20 n.7) borrowed his coherentism from Goodman’s claim about 
rules of inference and inferential practice, whether deductive or inductive; 
Goodman stated:
A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an infer-
ence is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of 
justification is the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between 
rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the only 
justification needed for either. (Goodman 1955, 64)
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Goodman’s formulation expressly concerns what we (purportedly) do, name-
ly, that we trim specifics to fit our principles, and trim our principles to fit 
specifics. Nothing in his observations show that we ought to do this, nor how 
we ought best or even properly to do this. Thus his remarks neither provide 
nor suggest any justificatory method. Goodman’s claim does nothing to link 
what we are willing or unwilling to accept, reject or amend to what we should 
be (un)willing to accept, reject or amend, nor to explicate how we ought best 
to make such adjustments. Hence Goodman’s remarks provide no method, 
and certainly no method of justification. Goodman’s mutual trimming of rules 
and inferences, or analogously of theory and data, is an exercise in conven-
tionalism, nothing more (cf. Westphal 2015).
Perhaps such mutual trimming might be credible regarding empirical knowl-
edge, where our claims, principles, theories and explanations must contend 
with natural fact and circumstance – though one of coherentism’s prime 
contemporary exponents, Laurence Bonjour (1997), finally conceded to Su-
san Haack that coherence does not suffice for justification even within the 
domain of empirical knowledge. Yet even that apparent empirical advantage 
lacks a credible counterpart within the moral domain. Moral ‘intuitions’ are 
insufficiently well-ordered to ground stable equilibria (Perlmutter 1998), and 
there are deeply and apparently irreconcilable ‘intuitions’ (if indeed that is 
what they are) amongst (schools of) philosophers.3 Thus reflective equilibri-
um as such can scarcely avoid (sub-)cultural or historicist relativism; instead 
it may indeed be a source – if not an instance – of it. ‘Reflective equilibri-
um’ may be the best for which we can initially strive in highly problematic 
domains; it may be a conditio sine qua non for any tenable view, but even in 
fraught domains our goals must include devising genuine justificatory meth-
ods or criteria for the domain in question. ‘Reflective equilibrium’ does not 
suffice for justification because, as Griffin (1996, 124–5) noted, it says so 
very little (cf. Daniels 1996, 333-52).
Now Rawls does have a method, but that method lies in his elaborate use of 
the veil of ignorance and its progressive lifting. This method, however, can-
not identify or justify basic moral principles, because his method presumes 
prevalent agreement about liberal fundamentals of distributive justice. If this 
feature becomes more pronounced in his later writings, it is already present 
in the first edition of his Theory of Justice, about which B.J. Diggs observed: 
If we asked John Rawls whose theory of justice this is, he would say, it is 
our theory of justice.4 Rawls’ methods cannot justify the republican right to 
3 On Rawls, see O’Neill (2003) and Reidy (1999, 2000).
4 Diggs made this remark in his undergraduate course in political philosophy (at the 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), which I had the good fortune to take (ca. 
1971). I recall his observation clearly because I was surprised by it; I remain equally 
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non-domination, nor the republican right to justification. For reasons first 
identified by Kant’s Critical method, these two rights are two aspects of the 
sole innate right to freedom; they are presupposed, rather than justified, by 
any tenable form of liberalism.
To appreciate Kant’s Critical insights into rational justification in substan-
tive domains, it is important to recognise that the justificatory failures just 
noted about self-evidence, about values or ideals as major premises, about 
coherence and about reflective equilibrium are, quite literally, ancient news: 
They are each variations on the old sceptical wheel, paradigmatically formu-
lated by Sextus Empiricus in the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion. This 
Dilemma poses the problem of justifying criteria of truth – or likewise crite-
ria of justification – within any disputed domain. In disputes about specific 
substantive issues where no answer is patently obvious, issues easily arise 
about how to justify whatever one adduces as relevant evidence or reasons 
for one’s view on that substantive issue. The problem is that spelling out 
one’s account of, or approach to, justification can easily prompt further dis-
pute about it, thus raising issues about whether or how to justify criteria of 
justification, whenever justification and its methods or basis are or become 
controversial. Sextus states the Dilemma in terms of criteria of truth, but the 
same dilemma arises with regard to criteria of justification:
... in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of 
truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to 
judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dis-
pute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument 
thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the cri-
terion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who claim to 
know something] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to 
judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. 
And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, 
while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced 
into circular reasoning. (Sextus Empiricus 1933, 2.4.20, cf. 1.14.116–7)
Though often mistaken for the Pyrrhonian original, Chisholm’s (1982, 61–
77) ‘Problem of the Criterion’ is much simpler and far less flexible than the 
Dilemma of the Criterion (Westphal 1998, 2014). The Pyrrhonian Dilem-
ma of the Criterion cannot be resolved by the typical accounts of, nor ap-
proaches to, rational justification prevalent in philosophy, and especially 
puzzled today about anyone – or any group – ‘owning’ a distinctive theory of justice. 
Perhaps Diggs’ observation also had in view such cold war issues as Dewey’s (1938) reply 
to Trotsky. Such communitarianism is an unnecessary default; what I call ‘Natural Law 
Constructivism’ is much more robust, cogent and cosmopolitan (Westphal 2016a). (It 
may be worth noting that B.J. Diggs is amongst those Rawls (1971, xii) acknowledged for 
providing helpful correspondence concerning his second manuscript.)
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so in moral philosophy, where we lack uncontroversial counterparts to ob-
vious ordinary claims which, as Pyrrhonists concede, appear indisputable, 
such as ‘It is day’, or ‘I am now conversing’ (AL 1:391, 2:144). If we may agree 
on terms, we immediately confront issues about their proper scope or des-
ignation: ‘Virtue is good and vice is bad’, but which traits or acts count as 
virtuous or vicious? ‘Murder is wrong’, but which killings count properly 
as murder? ‘Respect all persons as free rational agents’, but who is a person 
or who are people? Certainly I do not expect to refute anyone’s bigotry by 
rational argument, but there are important considerations regarding how 
to identify bigotry, dogmatism, power-mongering or other forms of moral 
narrow-mindedness, and how to distinguish these from respectable forms 
of ardent, if heterodox conscientiousness.
4 Judgment to the Rescue?
If we focus solely upon propositions as premises in justificatory arguments, 
and upon their logical relations by which they are supposed to justify Some-
one’s conclusions about principles, policies or actions, the Pyrrhonian Di-
lemma of the Criterion – and its lesser cousins, Chisholm’s Problem of the 
Criterion or Williams’ (1988) ‘Aggripan Trilemma’ – are insoluble: Either 
we argue in a vicious circle, we launch a pointlessly infinite regress, we pre-
suppose what we ought to prove (petitio principii), or we regress back either 
to a false or to an irrelevant claim and admit defeat (cf. Alston 1989, 26–7).
However, there is much more to rational justification and to rational judg-
ment than what we can state and analyse in our explicit premises and argu-
ments. Frege (1879) rightly opposed psychologism: No merely descriptive 
account of our reasoning processes suffices to account for their validity – if in-
deed they are valid. Yet Frege also rightly focussed upon judgment and upon 
judgments, regarding their logical validity and regarding (in some contexts) 
their justifiedness (cf. Bell 1979). Recently I read widely in late Nineteenth 
Century (C.E.) European philosophy, and learned just how prevalent and 
problematic psychologism was.5 Since then, I have also learned that these 
same problems were widespread within philosophy of law at the turn of the 
Twentieth Century, with common appeals to psycho-social history regarding 
the root causes and consequences of legal systems.6 Nevertheless, Carnap’s 
5 E.g., Brentano (1874), Lipps (1901, 1912, 1913), Wundt (1907).
6 E.g., Gareis (1911), 9–11; Gareis (1911, 5n, 40 67) notes the importance of ethical 
considerations, but does not sufficiently distinguish the fact of voluntary submission to 
legal authority, or the fact that we may feel we have such a duty, from whether or when 
such submission to or acceptance of a legal order may be justified. Neither do Kocourek 
in his editorial note to Gareis (1911, 9–11n), nor MacDonell in his ‘Introduction’ to 
Berolzheimer (1912, xxxi). Issues about psychologism are not moot; following Quine, 
Pattaro (2005, xxvii, 190, 364, 373, 382–3, 388–406), expects great gains for philosophy 
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(1950a, §11) strategy for avoiding psychologism – to eschew consideration 
of judgment altogether, and instead to focus solely upon propositions and 
their logical analysis – was excessive, indeed, self-undermining.
Carnap’s exclusive attention to the logical analysis of concepts, their combi-
nations (in propositions) and the inferential relations between propositions 
was excessive even within his own semantics, for reasons important to recall 
here. Carnap’s case for concentrating upon logical analysis alone requires 
successfully distinguishing between questions ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to any 
linguistic framework. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks are, however, concep-
tual explications writ large: combinations of explicated concepts and princi-
ples sufficient to formulate the logical and physical laws for some domain of 
scientific inquiry. The problem is that assessing whether or in what regard(s) 
any explicatum improves upon its explicandum requires assessing whether 
or the extent to which the explicatum functions better within the context of 
its original, by better facilitating that scientific inquiry or explanation. Such 
assessment is fundamentally and ineliminably contextual, and explicatae can 
only be assessed if there is more to their use, to their syntactic structure and 
to their intensional content than what is explicitly formulated in any stat-
ed explicatum (or linguistic framework). Such assessment involves, Carnap 
observes, matters of degree and some form of expected utility. There can 
be such expected utilities only if the context within which the explicatum is 
used has some sufficiently stable and identifiable structure unto itself such 
that some explicatae or some linguistic frameworks can be more effective 
or efficient than others, and can be noted – that is: judged – to be more ef-
fective or efficient than others. Carnapian explication requires and involves 
fundamental aspects of semantic, mental content and also justificatory ex-
ternalism – the theses that some important aspects of semantic content (in-
tension), of mental content or mutatis mutandis of cognitive justification are 
not expressly and explicitly formulated within the propositions or linguis-
tic framework(s) in question, nor within or by the thoughts or judgments 
made by whomever devises, uses and assesses those explicatae. In sum, Car-
nap’s (1950a, 1–18) own explication of the method of conceptual explication 
of law and jurisprudence from future neuroscience. Those expectations are misplaced 
because the issues of identifying and justifying basic principles of justice are independent 
of neuro-physio-psychological explanations of how we are able to address these issues 
(Westphal 2016a). Quine preached ‘naturalized epistemology’ – a philosophical theory 
of knowledge which appeals to empirical psychology – though he never took his own 
advice (Westphal 2015). In principle and in practice, explaining how we can do x can 
never suffices for justifying whether or when we ought (not) to do x. A philosophy of law 
remains incomplete unless it addresses fundamental issues about when a legal system 
deserves to be accepted as legitimate, per Weber’s (1922, §22) sociological definition of a 
political state, in contrast to a dominant protection agency (Nozick’s term) – or worse.
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undercuts Carnap’s (1950b) own best attempt to divide framework-internal 
from framework-external questions, and to escape issues about judgment 
altogether. (This is the root of objectivity to which Burge (2010) has sought 
to redirect philosophical attention.)
These points about the contextual character of judgment are undergird-
ed by the ‘open texture’ of all empirical concepts (Waismann 1919, Austin 
1920, Wittgenstein 1958), according to which in principle we cannot pro-
vide necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper use of any empirical 
concept, because future instances or observations may always reveal unex-
pected characteristics which require revising our concepts, our use of them, 
or both. (This is a key reason why there can be no pure procedural justice.)
These externalist aspects to conceptual explications and their development, 
use and assessment all involve judgment and judgments, the point and con-
tent of which cannot be reduced or restricted to the explicit contents (inten-
sion) of the propositions which may state the content(s) of the judgments, 
inferences, explicatae or linguistic frameworks involved.
Carnap’s explication of conceptual explication also acknowledges that con-
ceptual analysis, classically conceived as identifying the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the proper use of any philosophically puzzling con-
cept (term, principle, statement) is insufficient for substantive issues within 
philosophy of science. That is correct, though this observation holds for all 
non-formal domains. It is striking and significant that, like Carnap, Kant too 
distinguished methodologically between conceptual analysis and conceptual 
explication, in these terms, and made it central to his Critical method that 
we cannot presume to provide necessary and sufficient conditions specify-
ing adequately the exact content (intension) of our key concepts and princi-
ples (KdrV A727–30/B755–8). Kant thereby dismissed Cartesian transparen-
cy about conceptual content, together with infallibilist presumptions about 
cognitive justification, indeed, about rational justification in all non-formal 
domains (morals and empirical knowledge).
A related reason why judgment is ineliminable was highlighted by Lewis 
Carol and by Quine. Carol (1895) pointed out that the inference principles 
used in syllogistic reasoning or proof cannot all be stated as explicit premis-
es in that reasoning or proof, without launching an infinite vicious regress: 
any premiss – including any premiss stating a rule of inference – can only be 
linked to other premises by using a rule of inference which is not itself one 
of those statements. Similarly, Quine (1936) noted that specifying any for-
mally defined logistic system – its basic symbols, terms and rules – requires 
using principles of deduction and also semantic rules in order to designate 
any set of marks as signs, to assign to those signs any semantic function, and 
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to specify the formation and inference rules which are the specified logistic 
system. Using semantic rules and using rules of inference requires judgment: 
intentional, self-directed, self-assessing reasoning about whatever consider-
ations pertain to the issue or inference or proof in question.
5 Kant’s Critical Reflections on Rational Justification.
There is a pervasive if often implicit presumption that using rules is in prin-
ciple no different than using algorithms to calculate by rote some desired 
conclusion as a corollary to whatever calculation one makes. This is false and 
deeply misleading. Even algorithms require judgment to develop them, to 
assess their adequacy and to assess their appropriate use. Rules or principles 
guide judgment; they do not dictate univocal, precise outcomes of judgment. 
The presumption that using rules or principles differs not at all from using 
algorithms, all of which is no more than the most mechanical use of syllo-
gistic deduction has two sources, both highly influential within philosophy, 
though neither is philosophical.
One source was Étienne Tempier’s condemnation in March 1277 of 220 
neo-Aristotelian theses, mostly in natural philosophy, as heretical. Tempi-
er’s condemnation was issued upon authority of the Roman Pope as Bishop 
of Paris (Piché 1999, Boulter 2011). Both explicitly and implicitly Tempier’s 
condemnation stated and implied that demonstrative knowledge requires 
proof that the opposite of the conclusion is impossible; all else is conjecture 
or opinion. This is where and how Aristotle’s emphatically flexible, broad-
ly Euclidian model of scientific knowledge was converted into deductivist 
infallibilism. Descartes’ grappling with the possibility of a malignant om-
nipotent deceiver and his official view of scientific explanations as no more 
than ‘possible’ explanations of natural phenomena, all wait in the wings of 
Tempier’s condemnation.
Much closer to our own day was the intensive effort during the Cold War 
to develop ‘expert’ systems of rules to try to safeguard against human error, 
which might lead to inadvertent or unwarranted though utterly disastrous 
nuclear strike. Systems of ‘expert’ rules can be very useful, though like algo-
rithms, developing and assessing the use of expert systems of rules requires 
judgment. If as Russell once quipped ‘there are only two forms of reason-
ing: deductive and bad’, then there is only bad reasoning, because deduction 
alone cannot assess the appropriate use of the first premises of any deduc-
tive reasoning. Cold War fixation upon systems of deductive rules as solely 
constitutive of reasoning led reason very nearly to lose its mind (Erickson 
& al 2013; cf. Porter 1995). Scrutinizing knowledge gained by deduction 
reveals how such knowledge involves much more than just deductive va-
lidity (Powers 1978).
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Central to Kant’s critique of our human powers of judgment are four fun-
damental though insufficiently familiar points:
(1) Reasoning using rules or principles always requires judgment, to guide 
the proper application of the rule or principle to the case(s) at hand (KdrV 
B169–75). Specifying rules of application cannot avoid this, because using 
rules of application also requires judgment. Wittgenstein’s alleged ‘scepti-
cism’ about rule-following is not at all sceptical about rule-following: he was, 
after all, an architect. Wittgenstein was sceptical only about formalist views 
of rule-following, which treat the use of rules as mere algorithms – the view 
embedded in the formalism central to the ‘expert’ systems of rules sought in 
the Cold War. If philosophers would pay more and better attention to en-
gineering and to actual natural sciences, rather than to pure mathematics 
or logical axiomatics, they would much better appreciate the use of rules in 
making or measuring approximations – however exacting those approxima-
tions may be. Such examples all confirm Kant’s and Carnap’s pronounced 
emphasis upon conceptual explication rather than conceptual analysis.
(2) Rational judgment is inherently normative, insofar as it contrasts to mere-
ly responding to circumstances by forming or revising beliefs, because judg-
ment involves considering whether, how or to what extent the considerations 
one now draws together in forming and considering a specific judgment 
(conclusion) are integrated as they ought to be integrated to form a cogent, 
justifiable judgment (KdrV A261–3/B317–9, B219).
(3) Rational judgment is in these same regards inherently self-critical: judg-
ing some circumstance(s) or consideration(s) involves and requires assess-
ing whether or how well one assesses (and judges) those circumstances or 
considerations as they ought best be assessed (KdrV A261–3/B317–9, B219).
(4) Rational judgment is inherently social and communicable (KdrV A820–
2/B848–50, A751–2/B779–80; KdU §40), insofar as judging some circum-
stances or considerations rationally involves acknowledging the distinction 
in principle between merely convincing oneself that one has judged proper-
ly, and actually judging properly by properly assessing the matter(s) at hand. 
Recognising one’s own fallibility, one’s own potentially incomplete informa-
tion or analysis and one’s own theoretical or practical predilections requires 
that we each check our own judgments, first, by determining as well as we 
can whether the grounds and considerations integrated in any judgment we 
pass are such that they can be communicated to all others, who can assess 
our grounds and judgment, so as also to find them adequate; and second, by 
actually communicating our judgments and considerations to others and 
seeking and considering their assessment of our judgments and consider-
ations (GS 8:145–6; below §§6.2, 7.1).
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6 Hegel’s Critical Reflections on the Possibility 
of Constructive Self-Criticism.
6.1 Hegel recognised that the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion is ex-
posed as a mere sceptical trope by the exercise of critical self-assessment, by 
which we can re-assess each consideration in any stretch of justificatory rea-
soning, we can re-assess each use of each consideration within that reasoning, 
and we can re-assess each link between any pair (or plurality) of consider-
ations. Fundamental to the possibility of constructive self-assessment, Hegel 
recognised, is that our awareness of any particular (object, event, structure, 
person, configuration, state of affairs, phenomenon) is not limited to the in-
tensional (classificatory) content of whatever concepts, principles or prop-
ositions we bring to bear in judging that particular. Philosophers occasion-
ally mention how important is self-criticism; Hegel is the only philosopher 
to analyse – indeed incisively – how it is possible, and how our capacity for 
self-assessment solves the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion (Westphal 
2017, §§60-64, 83-91).
6.2 Hegel further argued that our individual capacity for critical self-assess-
ment is both facilitated and augmented socially, by our collective capacities 
for constructive mutual criticism. Hegel’s analysis of this point builds upon 
Kant’s point about freedom of thought in ‘What is it to Orient Oneself in 
Thinking?’ There Kant contends that
... freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws except 
those which it gives itself; and its opposite is the maxim of a lawless use of 
reason (in order, as genius supposes, to see further than one can under the 
limitation of laws). (GS 8:145)7
This lawless use of reason naturally leads, Kant contends, to this situation:
... if reason will not subject itself to the laws it gives itself, it must bow 
beneath the yoke of laws given by another; for without any law, nothing 
– not even nonsense – can play its game for long. Thus the unavoidable 
consequence of declared lawlessness in thinking (of a liberation from the 
limitations of reason) is that the freedom to think will ultimately be for-
feited, and because ... arrogance is to blame, it will properly speaking be 
foolishly trifled away. (GS 8:145)
Lawful, that is: regular, rule-governed use of reason is required simply to 
make sense; to make statements, claims, or judgments; to refer intelligibly 
and intelligently to any subject matter under discussion; to make any justi-
fied or justifiable claims or judgments; and to assess their accuracy and jus-
tification. These points likewise hold for innovations, their identifiability 
7 Kant’s Sperrdruck is rendered by small capitals.
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(recognisability), their rational assessment and, in favourable cases, their 
justification.
Lawlessness in reasoning generates instead:
... an unbelief of reason, a precarious state of the human mind, which first 
takes from moral laws all their force as incentives to the heart, and over 
time all their authority, and occasions the way of thinking one calls liber-
tinism, i.e. the principle of recognising no duty at all. (GS 8:146)
These are exactly Hegel’s points in ‘The Animal Kingdom of the Spirit’ in the 
1807 Phenomenology (GW 9:216–28/§§397–417), where Hegel critically ex-
amines the interactions between a group of self-obsessed Romantic geniuses, 
each of whom proclaims that he alone understands and expresses whatever 
is of utmost importance to all. The direct consequence of this attitude is that 
anyone else’s expressions are handled as nothing but raw materials for one’s 
own – with the further result that no one understands or expresses anything 
at all intelligible. Hegel’s ‘Animal Kingdom of the Spirit’ is decidedly a liter-
ary counterpart to Hobbes’ lawless state of nature (cf. Shklar.1976, 96–141), 
a counterpart suggested by Kant’s own discussion of this point, with express 
reference by name to Hobbes (KdrV A751–2/B779–80).
6.3 The positive successor to ‘the Animal Kingdom of the Spirit’ is achieved 
at the very end of ‘Evil and its Forgiveness’, the closing sub-section of ‘Spir-
it’ (GW 9:340–62/§§632–671). There Hegel draws the ultimate conclusions 
of his analysis of mutual recognition and its constitutive role in individual 
rational self-consciousness.
The central significance of Hegel’s account of mutual recognition (Anerken-
nung) for rational justification is this: For anyone accurately and rationally 
to judge that s/he is a rational judge requires (1) recognising one’s own ra-
tional fallibility, (2) judging that others are likewise genuine, competent, yet 
fallible rational judges, (3) that we are equally capable of and responsible for 
assessing rationally our own and each other’s judgments and (4) that we re-
quire each other’s assessment of our own judgments in order to scrutinise 
and thereby maximally to refine and to justify rationally our own judgments. 
Unless we recognise our critical interdependence as fallible rational judges, 
we cannot judge fully rationally, because unless we acknowledge and affirm 
our judgmental interdependence, we will seriously misunderstand, misuse 
and over-estimate our own individual rational, though fallible and finite 
powers of judgment. Hence recognising our own fallibility and our mutual 
interdependence as rational judges is a key constitutive factor in our being 
fully rational, autonomous judges. Only by recognising our judgmental in-
terdependence can we each link our human fallibility and limited knowl-
edge constructively to our equally human corrigibility, our ability to learn 
592
Hegel’S JuSTIFICATIon oF THe HuMAn RIgHT To non-DoMInATIon Kenneth R. Westphal
– especially from constructive criticism. Therefore, fully rational justifica-
tion requires us to seek out and actively engage with the critical assessments 
of others (Westphal 2017, §§60-64, 83-91; see below, §7.6).8
According to Kant’s and to Hegel’s pragmatic fallibilism about rational justi-
fication, a judgment is justified insofar and so long as: (1) It is more adequate 
to its tasks than any alternative statement; (2) it is adequate to its designat-
ed range of use or phenomena; and (3) it remains adequate to its designated 
range of use or phenomena as its use is renewed upon new, relevant occa-
sions, which may included changed circumstances, context or information. 
In this way, Hegel further argues, the social and historical dimensions of ra-
tional justification in all non-formal domains requires and justifies realism 
about the objects of empirical knowledge and also strict objectivity about 
fundamental moral norms.
6.4 The contrast I have mentioned between formal and non-formal do-
mains is very specific: the one purely formal domain is a precise re-state-
ment of Aristotle’s square of logical oppositions, within which form alone 
suffices for the logical validity of these oppositions, which specify ‘all’, ‘none’, 
‘some’, ‘some not’ and ‘not’ (cf. Wolff 2009). All further domains – including 
mathematics and all other formalised domains – require semantic and exis-
tence postulates which are not themselves purely formal. Deduction suffices 
for justification within purely formal domains because deduction constitutes 
justification within purely formal domains. However, because non-formal 
domains involve non-formal semantic and existence postulates, deduction 
alone does not constitute justification within non-formal domains. ‘Falli-
bilism’ regarding justification is the view that justification sufficient for 
knowledge does not entail the truth of what is known. Fallibilism about 
justification is entirely compatible with our knowing necessary truths, say, 
in mathematics – or also in transcendental philosophy about, e.g., necessary 
features of rational human judgment. The ‘fallibility’ of the justification of 
any claim does not require that the claim might be false; it allows that any 
claim or its justification may be revisited and perhaps revised – though re-
visions may make it more precise, or its justification may be further corrob-
orated or strengthened! That there is no finality to rational justification in 
non-formal domains, does not entail that we err, nor that we lack sufficient 
accuracy or justification.
8 Conversely, constructive mutual criticism is undermined by piecemeal, unsystem-
atic philosophy, by philosophical factionalism (‘cultural circles’ or ‘philosophical  stances’ 
in van Fraassen’s [2002] sense), by substituting philosophical lines of policy for philo-
sophical theses (Carnap 1950b [1956, 208], cf. Wick 1951), by neglecting Carnap’s (1950b, 
1–18) distinction between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication or by neglect-
ing the distinction between formal and non-formal domains; see Westphal (2015c; 2017, 
§§100-110).
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Kant’s four cardinal points about the normativity of rational judgment 
(above, §5) are non-formal truths; nevertheless, they are truths about our 
capacity to form, justify and assess rational judgments. Such judgments and 
our exercising such judgment are required for us to make sense, to make any 
claims and to justify our claims – whether regarding facts, norms or acts. If 
those four cardinal points may be revisited or revised, any revisions will take 
the form of improving precision (and I have stated only the minimum neces-
sary; Kant’s precise statement is his entire critique of judgment throughout 
his Critical corpus) or corroborating their justification (or both). This is be-
cause any revisions must use these same normatively structured functions 
of rational judgment (see below, §7.4).9
7 Freedom and the Right to Autonomous Judgment.
If these issues about judgment, rational justification and fallibilism may seem 
far removed from issues of human rights, they are not – quite the contrary. 
Consider first how Kant linked them, for here too Hegel built upon and fur-
ther built up Kant’s Critical account of our capacities to judge.
7.1 Kant concludes ‘What is it to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ emphatically:
Friends of the human race and of what is most sacred to it! Accept what 
appears to you most worthy of belief after careful and sincere examina-
tion, whether of facts or rational grounds; only do not dispute that prerog-
ative of reason which makes it the highest good on earth, the prerogative 
of being the ultimate touchstone of truth.* Otherwise you shall become 
unworthy of this freedom, and you will surely forfeit it too; and besides 
that you will bring the same misfortune down upon the heads of other, 
innocent parties who would otherwise have been well disposed and would 
have used their freedom lawfully and hence in a way which is conducive 
to what is best for the world! (GS 8:146–7; tr. Wood)
9 Kant’s four points about rational judgment are synthetic claims which can be known 
a priori. Rejection of ‘the’ synthetic a priori because (supposedly) it involves or allows 
intuition of metaphysical truths is non-sense rooted in empiricist presumptions about 
‘rationalism’. Kant undermined rationalist metaphysics by appeal to a basic cognitive-se-
mantic point he learned from Tetens, who held that to ‘realise’ a concept is to demonstrate 
– ostend, point out, provide – instances to which that concept properly applies. This 
requires, Kant argued – cogently – localising relevant particular instances within space 
and time. In this way, Kant secured the key aim of verification empiricism, without in-
voking verification empiricism! Kant’s cognitive-semantic point holds regardless of the 
concepts or propositions (intension) at issue (Westphal 2004, 2013b). Hegel argued in-
dependently and cogently for this same basic cognitive-semantic point in the first chap-
ter of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (Westphal 2000, 2002–03, 2010). Hegel further 
realised that this cognitive-semantic point suffices to reconstruct the entirety of Kant’s 
critique of judgment, without appeal to transcendental idealism – nor to any comparable 
view (Westphal 2017).
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Now why, exactly, should reason be the ultimate touchstone of truth? Kant 
answers in his footnote to his conclusion:
*Thinking for oneself means seeking the supreme touchstone of truth in 
oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason); and the maxim of always thinking for 
oneself is enlightenment... . To make use of one’s own reason means 
no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume some-
thing, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule 
on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason. 
This test is one that everyone can apply to himself; and with this exam-
ination he will see superstition and enthusiasm disappear, even if he falls 
far short of having the information to refute them on objective grounds. 
(GS 8:146–7n; tr. Wood)
The ‘enthusiasm’ Kant here censures is the view that reason’s legislation is 
invalid, whereas ‘superstition’ is ‘is the complete subjection of reason to facts’, 
whether real or alleged (GS 8:145). A ‘universal principle for the use of rea-
son’ is a principle any and everyone can use to judge some subject matter. 
This reflects Kant’s observation in the Canon of Pure Reason, that ‘all knowl-
edge (if it pertains to an object of pure reason) can be communicated’ (KdrV 
A829/B857). This communicability of knowledge does not merely consist in 
announcing one’s opinions to others; it consists in publicising one’s analy-
sis, justificatory grounds and concluding judgment to others so that they too 
can consider one’s analysis, grounds and judgment, so that they too can find 
it cogent and sufficiently justified (KdrV A822–3/B850–1). This possibility 
of communicating one’s knowledge is a necessary condition constitutive of 
knowledge of any and every public object, event, structure, phenomenon, 
principle or practice. The Critical question Kant poses for any- and every-
one’s use of reason in this footnote is an important step forward from Kant’s 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method to the universalisability tests first pre-
sented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
7.2 The key to Kant’s universalisability tests is that universal communica-
bility (of this kind) is a necessary condition for rational justification in all 
non-formal domains. Consequently, any claim or principle – together with 
its purportedly sufficient justifying reasons – which cannot be universally 
communicated cannot, accordingly, be rationally justified. This holds inde-
pendently of the character, content or apparently compelling character of 
the claims, principles or reasons at issue. Kant’s insight into the moral as-
sessment or justification of actions is this: No omission of strict moral du-
ties, and no commission of morally prohibited actions, can be justified to 
all others by communicating the principles and purported justifying reasons 
for so acting (or omitting to act), such that they too can upon consideration 
assess one’s proposed action and its purported justifying grounds, and can 
decide and act on those same considerations on the same occasion and in 
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the same way as one thinks or acts. Maxims and acts of exploitation, illicit 
coercion or strong-armed robbery are ruled out because they over-power 
at least one person’s powers to decide how to act upon sufficient justifying 
grounds; maxims and acts of deception, fraud, lying or other forms of illicit 
stealth are ruled out because they evade at least one person’s powers to de-
cide how to act upon sufficient justifying grounds. No such act can be jus-
tified by sufficient reasons addressable to all others, such that they too can 
consider, think, decide and act on those same grounds and in that same way, 
on that same occasion and on all such occasions.10
Because universal communicability of principles and their (purported) justi-
fying grounds is a conditio sine qua non for the rational justification of those 
principles, together with any thought or action based upon or guided by 
them, Kant’s Natural Law Constructivism (Westphal 2016a) circumvents or 
at least circumscribes debates about ‘values’, especially when used as prem-
ises in moral assessments or justificatory moral reasoning. Of course there 
are important issues to be settled jointly – whether locally, domestically or 
internationally – about values, aspirations, policies, legislation and their of-
ten competing recommendations, but those debates can only occur, can only 
be effective and can only be resolved for cogent reasons, within the scope of 
the strict duties of justice identified by Kant’s universalisation tests, inde-
pendently of such contingent and diverse material premises. Consequently, 
moral or political debates about ‘values’, aims and aspirations can only per-
tain to elective, in principle justifiable policies, procedures, laws, customs or 
conventions. Debate about ‘values’, aims and aspirations as material premis-
es in moral reasoning does not pertain to the most fundamental principles 
of justice, which are the most fundamental principles of morals, identified 
and justified by Kant’s Natural Law Constructivism.
7.3 Freedom of thought, communication and action are all constitutively 
linked to freedom of rational judgment. Because we are free to do or fore-
bear, we can act as we should not. Hence moral prescriptions are for us im-
peratives: permissions, prohibitions or obligations. Because we cannot create 
anything ex nihilo, we cannot act at all without using space, time and materials 
around us. Because we are so interdependent, using materials effectively – 
hence without hindrance by others – requires social coördination by acting 
according to publicly established and acknowledged principles and practic-
es, so that we may each know how not to interfere with others’ use of their 
possessions. We are each within the moral domain because there is so very 
much we can and ought – or ought not – do to respect, assist, minister to or 
restrain others’ needs or actions. Because rational judgment is normatively 
10 Kant’s universalisability tests eliminates logoi which cannot possibly be orthoi; see 
Westphal (2016f).
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structured (per §5), it can be neither fully explicated nor explained in strict-
ly causal terms (Westphal 2016e, h). Freedom of action involves judging and 
deciding how to act. This requires exercising instrumental reasoning about 
which ends, strategies and means are feasible within the limits of one’s cur-
rently available resources, skills and abilities. Freedom of action also requires 
judging and deciding how it is permissible to act, or which act is (or which 
acts are) impermissible to omit. Judging what is and is not (im)permissible 
requires using Kant’s universalisation tests. Only by using these tests can we 
solve basic problems of social coördination legitimately, by solving them on 
the basis of reasons and analysis which are universally communicable (in 
the sense specified above, §5), and hence abide by Rousseau’s independence 
requirement, which is Kant’s sole innate right to freedom. No norm can be 
justified merely by empirical evidence, nor by mere logical or conceptual 
analysis. Normative justification lies in our rational capacities to judge and 
to act responsibly by achieving our ends only in ways which can be justified 
to all others, in part by honouring the host of acquired rights and obligations 
we very finite, mutually interdependent, embodied semi-rational agents in-
evitably require and acquire by living in a polity and its economy here on 
Earth. Amongst the facts to which reason in one’s own person should not 
be subordinated – to do so would be, as Kant says, superstitious – are facts 
about one’s own desires, preferences or inclinations, or also facts about one’s 
belonging to one or another tradition or community. Only by reasoning co-
gently and publically in view of Kant’s Critical analysis of our rational pow-
ers of judgment, together with his (merely implicit, never explicated) ‘practi-
cal anthropology’ – an inventory of basic constitutive features of our finite 
embodied agency: what we homo sapiens semi-sapiens are capable of doing 
and suffering, not what(ever) we may happen to believe or to feel or to admit 
we can do or suffer – can we identify and justify the most basic principles 
and practices of morals. These basics suffice to secure peace and sufficient 
concord for us legitimately to pursue, assess or plan our common wealth, 
domestically and internationally. Only because we are free rational beings 
are we within the moral domain; only because we can rationally understand, 
examine, address and (provisionally) resolve these issues about how best to 
act within the limits of justice and moral responsibility are we morally im-
putable agents – regardless of whether we recognise and fulfill our obliga-
tions. Rather than restricting justification to whatever grounds can motivate 
agents – an internalist and empiricist strategy – Kant’s Natural Law Con-
structivism first identifies and justifies what our duties and obligations are; 
the issue of bringing human motivation into accord with obligation Kant 
assigns to education – in all its forms – and to philosophy of education, all 
guided by the rights and obligations identified and justified by Natural Law 
Constructivism. All of these point are equally fundamental to Hegel’s further 
developments and justification of Natural Law Constructivism.
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7.4 When lecturing upon §433 of his Philosophical Encyclopaedia, concern-
ing the defective form of mutual recognition of master and bondsman, He-
gel observed:
... in this relation [of master and bondsman,] the posited identity of self-con-
sciousness of those mutually related subjects [has] only been established 
in a one-sided way.
As concerns the historical aspect of this relation now under discussion, it 
may be remarked here, that ancient peoples, the Greeks and Romans, had 
not yet achieved the concept of absolute freedom, as they didn’t know that 
the human being as such, as this universal I, as rational self-consciousness, 
is entitled to freedom. Amongst them, the human being was instead only 
held to be free, if he was born free. Hence amongst them freedom still had 
the characteristic of naturality. Hence in their free states there was slavery 
and amongst the Romans there were bloody wars in which slaves sought 
to free themselves, and to win recognition of their eternal human rights. 
(Enz. §433Z; tr. krw)
Important here is Hegel’s characterisation of the very concept of ‘absolute 
freedom’, as the right to freedom of any human being as such. This is indeed 
the crucial constitutive universalisation of freedom as a right of human beings, 
and so of each and every human being as such (universal rights), in contrast to 
juridically granted communal or political rights to freedom (rights of mem-
bership).11 To be sure, Hegel reiterates this key point, that ‘justice (Recht) and 
all of its determinations are grounded solely upon free personality, a self-de-
termination’, in his published Remark to Enz. §502.12
This absolute concept of freedom and of the individual right to freedom He-
gel discusses in his Philosophical Outlines of Justice when contrasting property, 
11 Hegel’s discussion here of the ‘absolute concept of freedom’ is quite the opposite to 
the ‘absolute freedom’ which all too easily leads to political terror (PhdG, GW 9:316–
28/§§582–595); that ‘absolute freedom’ is the negative freedom of individuals from their 
economic, civil, political and juridical principles, institutions and practices.
12 Because scepticism about Hegel’s views is so entrenched, here is his Remark in full: 
‘The expression natural law (Naturrecht), which has typically denoted philosophical doctrine 
of justice, contains the ambiguity, whether justice (Recht) is something immediately on hand 
naturally, or whether it is meant as specified by the very nature, i.e. by the concept [of justice]. 
Previously the former sense was typical, so that at once a state of nature is feigned, in which 
natural justice is supposed to be valid, whereas the social condition and the state is rather a 
limitation of freedom and requires sacrificing natural rights. In fact, however, justice and all 
of its determinations are grounded solely upon free personality, a self-determination, which is 
rather the opposite of a natural determination. Hence natural justice is the existence of strength 
and force making itself valid, and a state of nature is a condition of violence and injustice, 
about which nothing can be more truly said, than that it shall be vacated. In contrast, society 
is instead the condition in which alone justice has its actuality; what is to be limited and 
sacrificed is indeed the arbitrariness and violence of the state of nature’ (Enz. §502R; tr. krw).
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which in principle is always alienable, to inalienable, entirely personal goods. 
Here is the relevant passage, translated from Hoymeyer’s transcript of He-
gel’s lectures of 1818–19:
§35 [Alienation of property and its limits] My property I can alienate, inso-
far as by its nature the thing is something external. Accordingly, those goods 
are inalienable – just as the right to them cannot expire – which constitute 
my own-most person and the universal [character] of my self-conscious-
ness, – as my personality as such, freedom of the will, ethical life, religion.
If inalienable goods nevertheless are alienated, their restoration can thus 
be demanded immediately, for they are without term: Droits de l’homme.
One must not remain with this abstraction of these human rights. Yet this 
principle as such is absolute [sic]: that, even if a nation has alienated these 
rights, they can immediately reclaim them.
My ethical law is my being; it is not something alien to me. In religion I 
intuit my being, I seek to produce within myself the consciousness of my 
identity with my being. How can it occur, that these be alienated, that an-
other becomes master of our ethical life etc.? The reason is that such re-
lations consist in my making myself objective within them, that I posit a 
differentiation between myself as particular and as universal; if I remain 
merely particular, then the universal is for me a power, something foreign, 
an external power. [This is] the path of superstition, servitude. Hence I 
must know the universal in stable identity and relation to me, to remain 
truthfully extant. The slave, so soon as he says he is free, is from that mo-
ment free and owes no compensation to his master, indeed he can still de-
mand provisions from him. Thus one can liberate oneself also from any 
coercion by ethical life or by religious faith. (Nachschrift Homeyer, Berlin 
1818–19; Ilting 1985, 230; tr. krw)
Hegel stresses exactly this contrast – between that which in principle may 
be alienated and our inalienable, most personal rights and freedom to live 
ethically and piously in understanding ourselves and our moral obligations 
and aspiration – in all of his lectures, in his own lecture notes, and in the 
published text of Rph §66 and his Remark to that section.13
In exactly this same connection, Hegel stressed at the outset – against the 
historical school of jurisprudence (Hugo, von Savigny) – that for all their ju-
ridical accomplishments, the Romans lacked a proper definition of the hu-
man being as constitutively free (Rph §2R); only thus could they admit slav-
ery (Rph §3R), though consequently neither the Romans, nor their fervent 
13 Cf. Rph §§65, 66+R (GW 14.1:29; 14.3:78,15); Vorlesungen zur Rechtsphilosophie: 
1817–18, §29; 1818–19, §35: Ilting 1:263–4; 1819–20, 29.470–494; 1822–23, re: Rph 
§66, Ilting 2:273, 3:249, 255; 1824–25, re: Rph §57+R, Ilting 4:241–2; re: Rph §66R, Ilting 
2:277; re: Rph §68R, Ilting 4:239.
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conservative advocates, the historical jurisprudes, could grasp the proper 
basis of justice and rights, which is the free human will, our rational capac-
ity to judge and decide how to act (Rph §4).
7.5 Equally important to the absolute right to freedom of each and every 
human being, is Hegel’s observation that ‘One must not remain with this ab-
straction of these human rights’. Instead, Hegel’s Outlines detail why each and 
every human being in an industrialised commercial nation deserves citizen-
ship in a sufficiently just, well-functioning (small ‘r’!) republic. To be legiti-
mate, a republic must establish, secure, facilitate and promote fundamental 
civic rights and freedoms of person, belief, property, profession and trade 
(Rph §§35, 36, 38, 41–49, 57, 62R, 66, 206, 207, 209R, 252, 270R), including 
the rights to earn one’s livelihood, to effective political representation and 
to being regarded as an equal citizen in good standing (Rph §§241, 244, cf. 
§§238Z, 244Z). Acquiring and exercising such rights further requires hon-
ouring each newborn’s right to proper and sufficient nurture and education, 
both informal and formal (Rph §§174, 209+R). Education must centrally in-
clude education for that most important public office – the office of citizen.
Hegel’s Philosophical Outlines of Justice details how to instantiate and institu-
tionalise human rights by integrating them with correlative human respon-
sibilities and opportunities within republican commercial societies, where 
the absolute right to freedom is and remains the fundamental benchmark 
for the legitimacy of our political, civil and legal institutions and practices, 
all of which are to protect, promote and respect the development and exer-
cise of mature judgment in all of our deliberations and activities, whether 
familial, social, civil or political. The absolute concept of individual freedom 
must continually be reconsidered as we come to reconfigure our freedom 
by reconfiguring our free activities through our on-going cultural, econom-
ic, civic and political developments. Hegel’s institutional designs for legis-
lation and for political representation aim to monitor the actual workings 
and consequences of our activities, individually and collectively, with regard 
to the sociological law of unintended consequences, so that social practic-
es required for legitimate free individual action be preserved or whenever 
need be protected legally, to counter-act unintended consequences of so-
cial practices which jeopardize individual freedom of action, and to revise 
legal and civil institutions so as to avoid or to minimize so far as possible 
such illegitimate, unjustifiable unintended consequences of social practices 
– including, centrally, economic, financial, legislative and political practic-
es (Westphal 2016c, d).
The plurality of culturally, historically or legally specific conceptions of hu-
man rights is not, of itself, a problem, nor should it be surprising: We should 
expect the identification and formulation of human rights and obligations 
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to keep pace with new developments in the ways and means of degrading, 
evading, exploiting or violating the freedoms, responsibilities and vulner-
abilities of individuals’ finite embodied semi-rational agency (cf. Beyleveld 
& Pattinson 2000, 2010). My point here is, with Hegel and Kant, to identi-
fy the fundamental principle which justifies human rights as such, because 
it protects and promotes the very same rational freedom and capacities to 
identify and to justify basic moral principles as such, which hold for all of us 
finite, embodied semi-rational human agents. In this regard, we can agree 
with jurists who rescind natural law theory because an invariant yet specif-
ic, action-guiding law for all human cultures for all times is not to be found, 
without succumbing to historicism – nor to positivism – because the fun-
damental principles and processes of rational justification (in non-formal 
domains), together with their constitutive roles in free and responsible ra-
tional action, are constant: they are constitutive of the ‘absolute concept of 
freedom’ Hegel identifies, which serves as a guide to understanding and as-
sessing how and how well current social practices – including the econo-
my as well as government, communications and social and civil institutions 
– serve to support, protect and foster free responsible action by each and 
everyone, or to identify regards in which current social practices and insti-
tutions require and afford improvements in achieving and sustaining free-
dom and justice for all. 
This is the insight Hegel learnt from Montesquieu (Rph §3+R): None of us 
can by ourselves devise an adequate scheme for securing human freedom and 
justice; instead we must examine actual human activities as they have devel-
oped and are practised today, and as we engage in them as we anticipate and 
plan for tomorrow. This is one reason why history is so central to Hegel’s 
philosophy, including the history of Roman law and its Modern Occiden-
tal offspring. Moral philosophy, too, must be conducted as we have only too 
recently learned that history and philosophy of science must be conducted, 
wherein actual science – or actual human activities – must be accounted for 
properly and in detail by credible philosophical principles and theories. Em-
pirical information never suffices to identify or to justify normative princi-
ples or practices, though detailed empirical information about how we free, 
semi-rational agents have figured out how to achieve our ends effectively is 
indispensable to normative theory, and to improving the legitimacy and effec-
tiveness of our normatively structured practices, which always involves their 
on-going assessment, if we but pay attention to our manifold opportunities 
for constructive self-critical assessment and for mutual critical assessment. 
Self-styled radicals – whether right- or left-wing – who dismiss the adequa-
cy or relevance of contemporaneous legal, political and economic structures 
are not nearly radical enough, for they fail to recognise how our freedom of 
action and our rational capacities and abilities to assess the adequacy and 
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legitimacy of social practices and institutions are deeply rooted in our shared 
practices.14 These fundamental features of human agency and moral norma-
tivity can and should be made much more central to education for citizenship.
7.6 Education for citizenship involves not only considerable content re-
garding public institutions, principles, opportunities and procedures, it also 
involves these key skills and abilities, constitutive of mature judgment: (1) to 
discern and define the basic parameters of a problem; (2) to distinguish rel-
evant from irrelevant and more relevant from less relevant considerations 
bearing on a problem; (3) to recognize and to formulate important questions 
and sub-questions which must be answered in order to resolve a problem; (4) 
to determine proper lines of inquiry to answer those questions; (5) to identify 
historical or social factors which lead people – including ourselves! – to for-
mulate questions or answers in particular ways; (6) to think critically about 
the formulation or reformulation of the issues; (7) to consider carefully the 
evidence or arguments for and against proposed solutions; (8) to accommo-
date as well as possible the competing considerations bearing on the issue; 
(9) through these reflections and inquiries, to resolve a problem, so far and so 
well as is now possible; and ultimately (10) to organize and to present these 
considerations clearly and comprehensively to all interested – that is, to all 
affected – parties (Westphal 2012, 2016e). (Note that accommodating com-
peting considerations requires assessing which of these considerations are le-
gitimate, insofar as they are consistent with the independence requirement.)
Because rational justification in all non-formal, substantive domains is fal-
lible, to judge rationally is to judge matters thus:
To the best of my present abilities, understanding and information, this 
conclusion is justified for the following reasons and in the following re-
gards – what do you think?
This point of humility about the fallibility of one’s own rational competence 
follows from and supplements the four basic points regarding rational judg-
ment and justification indicated earlier (§5).
Because rational judgment is fallible, and because it involves one’s own, as 
it were, ‘perspectival’ assessment of the relevant evidence, principles and 
the interrelations among these, rational judgment is also fundamentally so-
cial. Constructive mutual criticism facilitates constructive self-criticism and 
renders it a social phenomenon by facilitating (or enabling) the identifica-
tion of discrepancies between our conceptions of our knowledge and the 
objects of our knowledge and our experience of the objects we know and 
14 In this I agree with Dewey, F.L. Will (1988) and James Wallace (2008), each of whom 
followed Hegel’s lead in this important regard.
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our experience of our own cognitive constitution and activities, and anal-
ogously for action, regarding either intended and actual consequences or 
purported and actual justifying reasons. ‘Reason’ and ‘rationality’ are ex-
hibited, not primarily by deductive competence, but by responsiveness to 
evidence, analysis, reasons and their assessment, in ways which can and do 
improve our views, whether by corroboration, elaboration, revision or re-
jection. Deductive logic is, as Kant (KdrV A10–12, 53, 60–3, 797–8/B24–6, 
77, 85–8, 824–5) recognised, a canon for judgment, but outside pure axio-
matics, deductive logic is no organon for knowledge, neither in morals nor 
in empirical knowledge. Acquiring, assessing and improving our knowledge 
and understanding requires recognising our own fallibility, and our capaci-
ty for self-critical assessment, and our constitutive interdependence, first to 
become rationally competent, imputable agents, and second to re-assess our 
own most considered judgments (cf. Westphal 2016f). Rationality requires 
modesty and humility about our own most considered judgments. This is 
consistent with our advocating our views vigorously, but rules out our ad-
vocating or applying them dogmatically, and especially not to the disadvan-
tage of others’ legitimate interests.
7.7 To devote this much attention to details about judgment and rational 
justification in order to justify and to highlight the importance of modesty 
or humility may seem absurdly anti-climatic. To the contrary, precisely this 
constitutive role for humility and modesty in rational judgment and justi-
fication is decisive for the ecumenical universalism we most dearly need in 
matters moral, and it is decisive for distinguishing credible views worth con-
sidering, and worthy interlocutors who represent those views sincerely, from 
the welter of forms of domineering egoism, extremism, power-mongering, 
sociopathic dogmatism, narrow-mindedness or sheer idiocy – the kinds of 
dogmatism which insist that one’s own size does fit and must be fitted to all 
others, regardless of what they may justifiably say or think about it.
This humility, modesty and inquiring reconsideration of core issues and our 
most considered judgments on those issues is a fundamental, ecumenical, 
very widely and centrally shared tenet of credible moral views globally and 
historically; it is central to Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Shinto, Ancient 
Greek moral philosophies, all three Abrahamic religions – Judaism, Chris-
tianity and Islam (cf. Runzo & al. 2003) – and to secular humanism; e.g., the 
Ethical Culture Society. These three virtues are the moral and jurispruden-
tial counterparts to the Hippocratic oath: Above all, do no harm! These three 
virtues are (partly) constitutive of moral integrity, which is required both to 
acquire and exercise rights and to hold and execute obligations (Westphal 
2016f). These basic points are (partly) constitutive of our being trustworthy, 
and so to our being responsible members of the moral community.
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One reason why this humility and modesty are so important lies in an import-
ant observation by Kant, which Hegel recognised and augmented: They both 
adopt, endorse and justify an important Stoic aspect of individual rational 
freedom – the freedom to neglect one’s own desires or inclinations because 
they are judged to be unworthy, illegitimate or immoral. The root of ‘radical 
evil’ in human nature is our chronic tendency to grant priority to whatev-
er one desires over what morality requires, rather than granting priority to 
what morality requires over whatever one desires. Yes: merely instrumental 
accounts of rationality are radically evil, as are self-aggrandizing neo-liberal 
claims to profits over civil and human rights of all citizens. As noted above, 
Kant and Hegel identify superstition with subordinating one’s own reason to 
facts – of whatever kind. These facts may include, e.g., one’s de facto inclina-
tions, preferences or expected utilities, or instead one’s communal tradition. 
Like all forms of superstition, i.e., all forms of subordinating reason to facts, 
these views too are heteronomous. That one happens to want something, or 
that one proposes to act in accord with one’s traditions, does not, of itself, 
touch the moral questions of whether what one wants or proposes may be 
prohibited, permissible or obligatory.15
8 Distinguishing Criticism from Cavil, Prophecy from Pretext.
Doubtless some will respond to these considerations about rational judgment 
and justification as I did to Pettit’s appeal to psychology, but such rejoinders 
are mistaken, profoundly so. Kant’s four cardinal points about the normative 
structure of judgment (above, §5) are altogether neutral about normal human 
psychology as any substantive basis for understanding mental health and its 
social conditions. More likely are rejoinders which press those four points 
into the place held by a major premiss in a simple deductive syllogism, and 
then reject that premiss modus tolens tolendo. Such rejoinders are, in principle 
and in practice, unalloyed examples of ancient scepticism: they insist dog-
matically that dogmatism is the only possible form of rational justification. 
This is false in theory and pernicious in practice, regardless of how widely 
shared such practices and attitudes may be. These features of rational judg-
ment and the explication of mature judgment (above, §7.6) help to identi-
fy genuine cases of critical assessment, and to distinguish these from mere 
15 The most sophisticated form of merely instrumental justification of moral principles 
is Gauthier’s contractarianism; I respond to it en detail – and on Kant’s behalf – in Westphal 
(2016a), §§29–34. Kant’s ‘Incorporation Thesis’ (Allison’s designation), that no desire, 
inclination, ground or principle is a motive to act unless and until it is incorporated by the 
agent into her or his judgment about how to act – simply applies Kant’s theory of judgment 
to action; Hegel adopts the same view (Rph §§5–7ff). Issues about causal determinism and 
freedom of the will are fundamentally ill-conceived, and require no idealist solution: In 
principle the key premiss of the debate is unjustifiable; see Westphal (2016g).
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rejoinder, protest or rejection. Of course someone might say that the pres-
ent analysis is just one more Occidental view seeking to impose itself upon 
others – but talk is cheap: justifying any such assessment requires detailed 
analysis and evidence, quite the opposite of mere cavil.
To the rejoinder that I stake my account of freedom, rights and duties on 
a specific and controversial kind of epistemology, I grant that I do so, and 
I respectfully submit that I have examined the relevant epistemological is-
sues and views in sufficient critical detail over the past three decades. I fur-
ther submit that the present considerations about rational judgment, jus-
tification and their social dimensions provide much stronger justification 
for the republican rights to non-domination and to justification than those 
provided by Pettit, Honneth or Forst.16 If someone proposes another way to 
identify and to justify basic moral norms, let him or her first show that the 
alternative approach does not succumb to the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the 
Criterion (above, §3).17
To insist that only uncontroversial claims can serve as premises in  justificatory 
arguments is, in Kant’s phrase, the euthanasia – if not suicide – of reason: 
Controversy only merits respect when it is supported by cogent reasons and 
reasoning. This requires a kind and scope of education, training and con-
sideration that has been – and continues to be – eroded and undermined by 
over-specialisation in the field, coupled with excesses of conventionalism 
unleashed by Quine and his followers (Westphal 2015). Excellent scholar-
ship on Kant’s Critical philosophy has been available in English for over a 
century (Watson 1891, Caird 1899), but ‘mainstream’ Anglophone philoso-
phers continue to think in the pre-Critical ruts carved by Descartes, Hobbes, 
D’Holbach and Hume (cf. Westphal 2016g).
Turning to more practical issues, there can be no serious justificatory ques-
tion that peace and petition have moral priority – as matters of justice, right 
and freedom – over petulance and perfidity. Identifying and distinguishing 
16 Forst (2007, 2011) rightly stresses reciprocity and interdependence, but relies too 
much upon acceptance and consensus – or rather, does not examine the issues involved 
in distinguishing between de facto acceptance or consensus, and what principles, institu-
tions, practices or policies merit acceptance, and so merit consensus as well. His view is 
internalist about justification, and suffers from the problems infecting coherentism and 
reflective equilibrium discussed above (§3). A more robust account of reciprocity is 
provided by Becker (1986).
17 Here I have not solved the Pyrrhonian Dilemma; I have only indicated some main 
points, and cited other research in which I examine, reconstruct, assess and defend Hegel’s 
solution to it (Westphal 2017). In my (2016a) I examine two paradigmatic alternatives: 
Gauthier’s sophisticated contractarianism, and Hume’s sentiment-based ethics, and argue 
in detail that neither these, nor the host of related contemporary forms of moral con-
structivism, succeed in identifying or justifying basic moral norms.
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actual instances of petulance or perfidity is not always easy, but one central 
indicator is the hallmark of rationality indicated above (§7.6): responsiveness 
to relevant evidence and cogent analysis. I am under no illusions about the 
many ways and the vast extents to which political processes and discourses 
not only neglect, but trample, evade or subvert the conditions required to 
form and to act upon mature judgments, often aiming to impose self-interest-
ed, factional or immature judgments upon the processes of legislation. Rather 
than concede that such practices belie the irrelevance of these considerations 
about mature judgment, let me turn those tables by using the conditions for 
mature judgment to underscore just how far we have allowed many of our 
political and legal institutions to stray from legitimacy. In many jurisdictions 
– foremost amongst them perhaps is my own ‘homeland’ and its insecurities, 
imaginary or real (the USA) – we have developed systems of political repre-
sentation which only respond to group needs or interests within the short 
to medium term, where the brevity of the term is set by election cycles (cf. 
Truman 1951, Olson 1965), so that none remain who speaks on behalf of 
the commonwealth and its long-term interests in justice, infrastructure and 
basic social services, sustainability (cf. Jones 1975, Curren & Metzger 2017) 
and sound fiscal policy and practice (Buchanan & Wagner 1977). 
There are splendid exceptions to such trends in the Nordic and Scandina-
vian countries, and to a significant extent also Germany. The decline of self-
styled liberal democracies into tyrannical majorities – or vocal minorities 
– can only be blocked by robust, inclusive, small ‘r’ republicanism. Some in-
stitutional provisions to counter such descent into competing political spe-
cial interests are, e.g., the Italian law which requires all citizens to vote in 
national elections, and facilitates their voting by making election day a hol-
iday; the ballot option of voting for ‘none of the above’ (nota), used in Ban-
gladesh, Columbia, India, Greece, Spain, Ukraine, and in Russia – introduced 
by Gorbachev, though abolished in 2006 – though only in one state of the 
USA: Nevada. Perhaps most impressive was the provision of ancient Athe-
nian democracy to protect democracy against demagoguery by public voting 
for ostracism, by which arrogant power-mongers could be sent abroad for a 
decade – in sharp contrast to current politics, when such arrogant types are 
most likely to be elected to high office. To that ancient Greek practice we 
owe the very term ‘ostracism’: votes were recorded by etching a candidate’s 
name on pot sherds called ‘ostraka’ (singular: ‘ostrakon’).
9 Conclusions.
To the best of my present abilities, understanding and information, these 
conclusions about justice, rational justification and human rights are justi-
fied for the reasons and in the regards summarised herein; pray tell, what do 
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you think – and why? How and how well does your assessment withstand 
this kind of critical scrutiny? Our lives, our laws, our systems of justice and 
the Socratic health of our souls hang in the balance. We can afford no fur-
ther negligence in these decisive matters!18
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Hegelovo opravdanje ljudskog prava na ne-dominaciju
Apstrakt
‘Hegel’ i ‘ljudska prava’ retko su povezivani i oznaka ‘ljudska prava’ retko se javlja 
u njegovim delima. Zaista, Hegel je kritikovan zbog izostavljanja ujedno građan-
skih i političkih prava. Moja pretpostavka jeste da su čitaoci tražili moderni De-
kalog i da su zanemarili kako Hegel pravda svoje stavove, i stoga samo koje sta-
vove opravdava. Filip Petit (1997) je preusmerio pažnju na republikansku slobodu. 
Hegel i ja se slažemo sa Petitom da je republikanska sloboda krajnje važna vred-
nost, ali apelovati na njenu vrednost, ili opravdavati je apelom na reflektivni ekvi-
librijum, nedovoljni su i u teoriji i u praksi. Rekonstruišući Kantovu kritičku me-
todologiju i objašnjavajući društveni karakter racionalog opravdanja u ne-formalnim 
domenima, Hegel pokazuje da je republikansko pravo na ne-dominaciju konsti-
tutivno za podjedanko republikansko pravo na opravdanje (Frost 2007) – gde su 
oba nužni uslovi za dovoljno racionalno opravdanje u svim ne-formalnim dome-
nima, uključujući zahteve za prava ili imputacije dužnosti ili obaveza. To je nepo-
sredna moralna, politička i pravna implikacija Hegelove analize uzajamnog pri-
znanja, i njegova temeljna, konstitutivna uloga u racionalnom opravdanju. 
Specifične posledice fundamentalnog republikanskog prava na ne-dominaciju 
moraju biti određene sagledavajući koji oblici nedozvoljene dominacije su mo-
gući ili verovatni unutar bilo kog specifičnog društva, u pogledu njegovih druš-
tvenih, političkih i ekonomskih struktura i funkcionisanja.
Ključne reči: Hegel, ljudska prava, ne-dominacija, Petit, republikanizam, oprav-
davanje, priznanje
